Ronald Draughon v. Cuna Mutual Insurance Society : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1988
Ronald Draughon v. Cuna Mutual Insurance
Society : Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Lewis B. Quigley; Bayle, Hanson, Nelson & Chipman; Attorneys for Respondent.
Craig G. Adamson, Eric P. Lee; Dart, Adamson & Kasting; Attorneys for Appellant.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Draughon v. Cuna Mutual Insurance, No. 880240.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1988).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/2188
BRIEF 
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
K F U 
50 
DOCKET Mn ^ Q . *Q34 f l «V 'A 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RONALD DRAUGHON, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
CUNA MUTUAL INSURANCE SOCIETY, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Appeal from the Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Davis County 
Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby, District Judge 
Lewis B. Quigley 
Linda L.W. Roth 
BAYLE, HANSON, NELSON & CHIPMAN 
1300 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for 
Defendant-Respondent 
Craig G. Adamson 
Eric P. Lee 
DART, ADAMSON & KASTING 
310 South Main, Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
FILED 
OCT 61987 
5* {" r-K 0T . ^> ^ || 
- U ^ 4 U -
Case No. 870174 
Clerk, Supreme Court, Utah 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OP UTAH 
RONALD DRAUGHON, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
CUNA MUTUAL INSURANCE SOCIETY, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 870174 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Appeal from the Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Davis County 
Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby, District Judge 
Lewis B. Quigley 
Linda L.W. Roth 
BAYLEf HANSON, NELSON & CHIPMAN 
1300 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for 
Defendant-Respondent 
Craig G. Adamson 
Eric P. Lee 
DART, ADAMSON & KASTING 
310 South Mainf Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
e 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1 
Nature of the Case 1 
Course of the Proceedings and Disposition 1 
Statement of the Facts 1 
Summary of Arguments 3 
ARGUMENT 
MRS. DRAUGHON'S KIDNEY DISEASE, WHICH 
EXISTED PRIOR TO ISSUANCE OF DEFENDANT'S 
INSURANCE POLICY, WAS A MATERIAL 
CONTRIBUTING CAUSE OF HER DEATH AND, 
THEREFORE, NO COVERAGE IS PROVIDED 4 
A. THE PHRASE, "MATERIAL CONTRIBUTING 
CAUSE," MUST BE INTERPRETED MORE 
BROADLY THAN THE LEGAL TERM, 
"PROXIMATE CAUSE" 4 
B. "MATERIAL CONTRIBUTING CAUSE" IS 
NOT AN AMBIGUOUS PHRASE 8 
CONCLUSION 10 
-i-
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases Cited Page 
Bergera v. Ideal National Life Ins, Co,, 
524 P.2d 599 (Utah 1974) 8 
Coddington v. SAIFf 68 Or App 439, 
681 P,2d 799 (1984) 5 
Grable v. Weyerhauser Co,, 291 Or 387, 
631 P.2d 768 (1981) 5 
Manous v. Argonaut Inc., 79 Or App 645, 
719 P.2d 1318 (1986) 5 
Mitchell v. Pearson Ent., 697 P.2d 
240 (Utah 1985) 7 
Peterson v. Eugene F. Burrill Lumber, 
294 Or 537, 660 P.2d 1058 (1983) 5 
Other Authorities 
Couch on Insurance, Section 41:408 4, 8 
-li-
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The only issues before the Court are whether the lower Court 
properly interpreted the phrasef "material contributing cause," and 
whether that interpretation was correctly applied to the uncontro-
verted facts established by the parties, 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Plaintiff Ronald Draughon brought an action for a declaration 
of coverage under a credit life insurance policy issued by CUNA 
Mutual Insurance Company ("CUNA") for the death of his wife. CUNA 
has denied coverage on the basis of an exclusionary provision concern-
ing injuries or death resulting from conditions which existed prior 
to the issuance of the policy. 
Course of the Proceedings and Disposition 
The Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment. Defendant 
filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. On April 9, 1987, the 
District Court issued its Ruling granting Defendant's motion for 
summary judgment and denying Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. 
The Judgment was signed on May 5, 19 87. 
Statement of the Facts 
Plaintiff Ronald Draughon brought this action seeking a declara-
tion of coverage under a credit life insurance policy issued by CUNA 
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Mutual Insurance Company ("CUNA"). (R. 1-3) The policy was issued 
in connection with an automobile loan made in October, 1985, to 
Ronald and Sandra Draughon. Subject to certain conditions and 
exceptions, the insurance contract obligated CUNA to pay the balance 
due on the automobile loan in the event of the death of Sandra 
Draughon. (R. 51) 
Prior to issuance of the policy in 1982, Sandra Draughon was 
diagnosed as having reflux nephropathy (kidney disease). (R. 27-
28) Her disease was initially treated with hemodialysis three times 
per week, for three to four hours per session. (Deposition of W.A. 
Border, M.D., p. 14) Her treating physician, Dr. Border, reported 
numerous side effects of renal failure from which Mrs. Draughon 
suffered, including anemia, insomnia and restlessness. (Deposition 
of W.A. Border, M.D., p. 14) The dialysis treatment also created a 
range of side effects to which Mrs. Draughon was subject, such as 
vomiting, muscle cramps and hypotension. (Deposition of W.A. Border, 
M.D., p. 17) A kidney transplant, if successful, would have allevi-
ated those side effects. (Deposition of W.A. Border, M.D., p. 15) 
The decision to undergo a kidney transplant is made after 
extensive counseling with the patient. Once the decision is made 
to proceed, there is a delay of four to six months while the patient 
awaits a donor. (Deposition of W.A. Border, M.D., pp. 5-7) Following 
issuance of the insurance policy in October, 1985, Sandra Draughon 
underwent a kidney transplant in November, 1985. (R. 1, 7, 28) Fol-
lowing post-surgical treatment, Sandra Draughon developed pancrea-
titis from which she eventually died on February 7, 1986. (R. 28) 
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CUNA denied Mr. Draughon's claim on the basis of the "risks not 
assumed" clause which states, in pertinent part: 
CUNA Mutual does not assume the risk and no 
benefit is provided for any loss if any material 
contributing cause of loss was from sickness or 
injury which first became manifest prior to the 
time insurance coverage was otherwise effective 
under the Contract. (R. 7-8) 
Summary of Arguments 
The disposition of this case depends upon only one issue: was 
Mrs. Draughon's kidney disease a material contributing cause of her 
death. The phrase, material contributing cause, as used in the 
policy is not ambiguous. It has a meaning which is easily understood 
by a person of ordinary intelligence. 
A material contributing cause is not necessarily a proximate 
cause of injury. It may be merely an important cause. Her kidney 
disease was clearly the cause of Mrs. Draughon's decision to undergo 
a kidney transplant. As a result of complications from the transplant 
surgery, Mrs. Draughon contracted the disease which caused her death. 
Even if the Court applies a proximate cause analysis to the 
phrase, it is evident that Mrs. Draughon's kidney disease was a 
proximate cause of her death. It was the efficient cause, the cause 
which set in motion all the other factors which eventually ended in 
her death. 
Because Mrs. Draughon's kidney disease, the onset of which 
predated the issuance of the CUNA policy, was a material contributing 
cause of her death, coverage under the credit life policy is excluded. 
Thus, the Court's judgment in favor of Defendant CUNA was proper and 
should be sustained by this Court. 
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ARGUMENT 
MRS. DRAOGHOJPS KIDNEY DISEASEf WHICH EXISTED 
PRIOR TO ISSUANCE OF DEFENDANT'S INSURANCE 
POLICY, WAS A MATERIAL CONTRIBUTING CAUSE OF HER 
DEATH ANDf THEREFORE, NO COVERAGE IS PROVIDED. 
The CUNA policy at issue in this case states in pertinent part: 
CUNA Mutual does not assume the risk and no 
benefit is provided for any loss if any material 
contributing cause of loss was from sickness or 
injury which first became manifest prior to the 
time insurance coverage was otherwise effective 
under the Contract. 
The Court on appeal is asked to interpret the phrase, "material 
contributing cause," in light of the facts presented to the Court 
concerning Mrs. Draughon's kidney disease and eventual death as a 
result of the complications from a kidney transplant operation. 
A. THE PHRASE, "MATERIAL CONTRIBUTING CAUSE" 
MUST BE INTERPRETED MORE BROADLY THAN THE LEGAL 
TERM, "PROXIMATE CAUSE" 
The Plaintiff has sought to characterize the phrase, "material 
contributing cause," as a synonym for the legal term, "proximate 
cause." There is no authority for such a definition. Indeed, the 
authority which has interpreted the phrase has established much 
broader parameters than those established for proximate cause. 
Couch on Insurance, Section 41:408, discusses the phrase, "con-
tributing cause of death," and states: 
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A provision excluding liability when a disease, 
defect or bodily infirmity is a contributing 
cause of death, in addition to excluding liabil-
ity in cases where disease, defect or bodily 
infirmity is a proximate cause of the insured's 
death, excludes causes where the disease, defect 
or bodily infirmity is a contributing cause of 
the insured's death regardless of whether the 
disease, defect or bodily infirmity is the prox-
imate cause thereof. 
Thus, although the proximate cause of death may be a contributing 
cause of the death, the reverse does not necessarily hold. 
The parameters in which the phrase, "material contributing 
cause" may be applied have been set by the Oregon Supreme Court in 
numerous cases decided in the context of Oregon's workmen's compen-
sation law. Contrary to Plaintiff's contention, the Oregon Court's 
interpretation of the phrase is relevant to the present case. 
Under Oregon's law, a workmen's compensation claimant is en-
titled to compensation for aggravation of an earlier compensable 
injury if the earlier injury is a material contributing cause of the 
present condition and not solely the result of a non-industrial 
cause. Grable v. Weyerhauser Co., 291 Or 387, 631 P.2d 768 (1981). 
The earlier compensable injury need not be the sole or even 
principal cause of the claimant's worsened condition. Manous v. 
Argonaut Inc., 79 Or App 645, 719 P.2d 1318 (1986); Coddington v. 
SAIF, 68 Or App 439, 681 P.2d 799 (1984); Peterson v. Eugene F. 
Burrill Lumber, 294 Or 537, 660 P.2d 1058 (1983). For instance, in 
Coddington, supra, the claimant had a history of degenerative disc 
disease and back problems, both prior and subsequent to her first 
industrial injury. She sustained a non-industrial injury to her 
back after the first industrial injury and subsequently suffered a 
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herniated disc. Even though the off-the-job injury contributed to 
the herniation, so did the first industrial accident. The first 
industrial accident was, therefore, a material contributing cause 
of the disc herniation. 
Similarly, Mrs. Draughon's kidney disease created the condition 
which required the transplantation operation and immunosuppressive 
treatment with Prednisone. The fatal pancreatitis which resulted 
from that treatment was linked inextricably to her original condition. 
Although the district court's decision is not binding on this 
Court, it is certainly entitled to consideration. The examples 
offered by the Court as the basis for its decision are cogent. The 
Court stated: 
As a practical matter, patients often do not die 
from their underlying illness; arteriosclerosis 
victims die of cardiac arrest and AIDS victims 
die of pneumonia, yet in those cases, the common 
perception of the resulting death is the under-
lying disease. 
If the Plaintiff's argument that because the transplant surgery 
was "elective" there was no relation between the kidney disease and 
the complications associated with that surgery is accepted, then 
most pre-existing disease exceptions in life insurance policies would 
be avoided. Clearly, if Plaintiff's argument is accepted, any 
complication of treatment for a disease would not be considered as 
caused by the disease. 
For example, a cancer patient may be given several years to 
live, but expected to have a less than normal life expectancy and 
to live with increasing pain. Radiation therapy could be expected 
to reduce the cancer's growth and thereby expand the life expectancy 
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and retard the pain. If that patient elects to undergo the radiation 
therapy and dies as a result of a complication therefrom, the cancer 
is certainly a contributing cause of the death. On the other 1 land, 
if the patient is killed in an automobile accident while driving to 
the hospital, to receive the radiation therapy, the automobile accident 
would be an intervening cause of the death. 
Fundamental fairness and logic require that the Court interpret 
the CUNA policy excl usi on to fii id that where the condition, kidney 
failure, was acted upon by other factors in an uninterrupted chain 
of causation, resulting from the good faith attempt to treat the 
disease, the disease is a material contribut I ng cause of the ultimate 
death. Any other interpretation would simply void the policy exclu-
sion, which the parties obviously intended to have some meaning. 
Even if the Court equates "material contributing cause" with 
"proximate cause," Mrs. Draughon's kidney disease must be considered 
a proximate cause of her death. Proximate cause is the cause, 
which in the natural and continual sequence, 
(unbroken by an efficient intervening cause), 
produces the injury without which the result 
would not have occurred. It is the efficient 
cause - the one that necessarily sets in operation 
the factors that accomplish the injury. Mitchell 
v. Pearson Ent., 697 P.2d 240 (Utah 1985), at 
245-246. 
It is Plaintiff's contention that the transplantation operation broke 
the chain of causation because the surgery was "elective." It cannot 
be reasonably contended that the transplant would have been proposed 
in the absence of serious renal disease. The treatment following 
the transp1ant opera11on apparen11 y foilowed the norma1 course for 
such operations, including administration of Prednisone, an 
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immunosuppresant drug. The adverse reaction to Prednisone in the 
form of pancreatitis is "an uncommon, but not unknown complication 
associated with kidney transplantation." (R. 49) Without kidney 
disease, a transplant operation would not have been performed and 
the resulting complications would not have occurred. 
B. "MATERIAL CONTRIBUTING CAUSE" IS NOT AN 
AMBIGUOUS PHRASE 
As stated in Couch on Insurance, Section 41:408, the phrase 
"contributing cause of death" connotes more than "proximate cause." 
It is merely a cause which contributes to the injury or death. The 
addition to the phrase in this policy of the word, "material," does 
not render the phrase ambiguous. It merely requires that the condition 
which contributes to the insured1s injury or death be important and 
not merely incidental. 
Insurance policies are merely contracts which are interpreted 
by usual rules of contract interpretation. The words contained in 
the insurance contract are to be given their "usual and ordinarily 
accepted meaning." Bergera v. Ideal National Life Ins. Co., 524 
P.2d 599 (Utah 1974). The phrase, "material contributing cause," 
has an ordinary meaning, easily understandable to a person of ordinary 
intelligence. 
In the present case, the kidney disease was an important contri-
buting cause of Mrs. Draughon's death. Her kidney disease required 
that she undergo dialysis treatment three times per week for three 
to four hours per session. (Deposition of W.A. Border, M.D., p. 14) 
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As a result of dialysis, Mrs. Draughon suffered vomiting, muscle 
cramps, and hypotension. (Deposition of W.A. Border, M.D.r p. 14) 
Dialysis also resulted in psychological dependence on dialysis. 
(Deposition of W.A. Border, M.D., p. 17) Kidney failure caused 
anemia, insomnia and restlessness. (Deposition of W.A. Border, M.D. , 
p. I 4 ) A kidney transplant would alleviate those reactions. (Depo-
sition of W.A. Border, M.D., p. 15) Mrs. Draughon's decision to 
undergo the transplant operation resulted from the ill effects of 
her diseased kidney. Certainly no such operation would be under-
taken on a person with a healthy kidney as Plaintiff seems to suggest 
^n h£ s krief a t page 26. Although Mrs. Draughon was extraordinary 
in her ability to participate in the usual activities of life while 
undergoing dialysis treatment, it is ridiculous to suggest, as the 
Plaintiff does, that she lived a normal life. The horrific side 
effects of the dialysis, as well as the time-consuming nature of the 
treatment, required a supreme effort from Mrs. Draughon to accomplish 
all that she did. Certain!y, the choice she made to have a kidney 
transplant was influenced by the possibility that she could thereafter 
forego dialysis. 
The treatment following transplantation included administration 
of the immunosuppressive drug, Prednisone, which her physicians have 
determined most likely caused the acute pancreati tis whi ch i iltimately 
resulted in her death. (R. 49) This chain of events establishes 
an unbroken sequence which starts with Mrs. Draughon's kidney disease 
and e-".-r * - leath. There cai i be i :io question that t rer kidney 
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disease was a material contributing cause of the complication which 
resulted in her death. 
CONCLUSION 
Mrs. Draughon's death as a result of pancreatitis was the end of 
a chain of causation which began with her renal disease. The renal 
disease was a condition which existed prior to the issuance of CUNA's 
insurance policy. The renal disease was a material contributing 
cause of Mrs. Draughon's death and her death is, therefore, excluded 
from coverage under the policy. The Court should sustain the lower 
court's grant of summary judgment to Defendant. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 6 day of October, 1987. 
BAYLE, HANSON, NELSON & CHIPMAN 
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent 
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